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The Economics of Morality




altruism is embedded in our biology and in our culture. we offer our bus seats 
to the disabled and elderly, give directions to disoriented tourists, and donate a 
portion of our income charity. Yet for all the good it does, there are deep problems 
with altruism as it is practiced today. nearly all of us, when asked, will say that we 
care about practicing altruism in a way that effectively improves the lives of others. 
almost none of us, when asked, can honestly say that we have made a serious effort 
to ensure that we are practicing altruism in a way that effectively improves the lives 
of others. disparities like these are indicative of flaws in our cognitive architecture - 
biases which ensure that the traditional practice of altruism is incongruous with our 
own values. This disconnect between our values and our actions causes our altruistic 
efforts to help fewer people to a lesser extent than they otherwise could. i argue that 
traditional altruism is in need of reformation and defend a social and philosophi-
cal movement aimed at achieving this reformation known as effective altruism. The 
reason effective altruism is such a promising alternative to traditional altruism is its 
application of economic thinking to the realm of altruism and morality. an econo-
mist’s mentality is, i suggest, a necessary instrument for bridging the gap between our 
values and our actions, allowing us to practice altruism in a way that more effectively 
improves the lives of others.
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inTrOdUcTiOn
People perform acts of altruism every day. when i describe an act as altruistic, 
i mean that the person performing the act (the donor) makes a personal sacrifice—
perhaps in terms of time or money—for the sake of improving the well-being of 
another conscious creature (the recipient). in this context, we will find it helpful to 
narrow the definition of altruism to describe only those altruistic actions in which the 
recipient is not a member of the donor’s family, friends, or community. for the pur-
poses of this paper, an action can be altruistic only if the donor has little expectation 
that she will have a personal or economic relationship with the recipient. altruism 
can be anything from holding the door for a stranger to donating a substantial amount 
of money to charity. almost everyone, i wager, behaves altruistically from time to 
time —some of us on a daily basis.
The problem with altruism, as it is currently practiced, is that it is ineffective at 
improving the lives of conscious creatures. in what sense is the ineffectiveness of al-
truism ‘problematic’? instead of appealing to moral obligations or duties, i will argue 
that the ineffectiveness of altruism is problematic in the sense that most of those 
who practice altruism would, on reflection, prefer to do so more effectively. when 
we behave as ineffective altruists, we are therefore failing to behave in accordance with 
our own preferences. The alternative is an ethical framework known as effective altru-
ism, which is most concisely described as “aiming to do the most good that one can”.
(singer & Macaskill 2015, p.viii)
This paper is divided into four sections. The first gives a more rigorous defini-
tion and explanation of effective altruism. following this, i explore the implications 
of effective altruism for population ethics, and show it to be a milder and more in-
tuitive philosophy than its close cousin, classical utilitarianism. The third section 
explains how cognitive biases cause us to behave as ineffective altruists, and suggests 
that our preferences would be better served by practicing altruism more effectively. 
finally, i draw an analogy between how we think about altruism and how we think 
about economics. as i hope to show, thinking of altruism economically will aid us in 
overcoming the cognitive biases that make altruism so ineffective.
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EffEcTivE alTrUisM
singer & Macaskill 2015 describes effective altruism as “aiming to do the most 
good that one can”. (ibid) while this definition succeeds in its concision and popular 
appeal, it leaves something to be desired in terms of specificity. we might wonder, for 
example, what is meant by doing good, and if there are any bounds on the amount of 
time and money effective altruists should devote to doing good. i offer my own defini-
tion here in hopes that it will help clarify some of these questions.
Effective altruism is the belief that we should endeavour to spend whatever re-
sources we plan to devote to valuable creatures who are unlikely to have a substantial 
impact on our lives in such a way as to maximize their aggregate well-being, provided 
we do not sacrifice anything else of importance in doing so.
suppose i plan to donate $100 to charity, and that for some reason i have to 
choose between two charities—a and B. Both a and B provide deworming treat-
ments for people in Kenya. for the same $100, a can deworm two people, but B can 
deworm only one. assuming a and B have similar externalities, i ought to donate to 
the charity which provides deworming treatments for two people rather than one. all 
else being equal, effective altruism holds that we should improve the lives of as many 
people as we possibly can. call this the helping more people (HMP) imperative.
now imagine i am faced with a different choice of charities—c and d. Both 
c and d feed families in Uganda. for the same $100, c can feed a family for two 
months, but d can feed a family for only one month. assuming c and d have similar 
externalities, i ought to donate to the charity which feeds a family for a longer period 
of time. all else being equal, effective altruism holds that we should improve people’s 
lives to the greatest extent we can. call this the helping people more (HPM) imperative.
Presented this way, effective altruism seems like a straightforward and appealing 
ethical philosophy. These are, of course, the easy cases. To think about more difficult 
cases, it will help to examine each piece of my definition in turn.
We should endeavour to spend whatever resources we plan to devote…
My view of effective altruism is weaker than what singer wants to propose. 
singer has argued, in previous works, that we should devote as much of our time 
and money to others as possible, stopping only when the marginal utility of keeping 
money for ourselves outweighs the marginal utility of donating money to others. (see, 
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e.g. singer 1972) Though i strongly believe we ought to devote more of our time and 
money to helping others than we currently do, all i want to claim here is that what-
ever resources we would have spent helping others in any case should be spent in 
such a way as to maximize the aggregate well-being of valuable creatures.
...to valuable creatures…
who is included in the set of creatures whose aggregate well-being we are trying 
to maximize? in other words, who should be the recipients of our altruism? i designate 
a set which i call valuable creatures. who exactly is included in this set may depend on 
the donor’s preferences. for example, a classical utilitarian would consider all beings 
capable of experiencing happiness and suffering—both those that currently exist and 
all those that could potentially exist in the future—as morally important. an anti-na-
talist, by contrast, values only creatures who currently exist and whose birth cannot 
be prevented. we may, as i do, wish to include nonhuman animals and artificial intel-
ligences in this set, or we may not. i leave this category purposefully vague.
in order to avoid repeating the awkward verbiage valuable creatures, i will often 
refer to the recipients of our altruism simply as people. Please understand that this 
term is not meant to exclude nonhuman creatures.
...who are unlikely to have a substantial impact on our lives…
To reiterate a point i made in the introduction, the altruistic actions under con-
sideration here are those in which the donor does not expect to have a personal or 
economic relationship with the recipient.
...in such a way as to maximize their aggregate well-being…
when evaluating the impact of an altruistic action, effective altruists care about 
1) how many people it helps (hMP imperative) and 2) how much it helps them (hPM 
imperative). But what happens when these measures come into conflict? for example, 
imagine i have to choose between charities E and f, both of which fight malaria by 
providing long lasting insecticidal bed-nets to villages in Malawi. charity E will use 
my $100 donation to provide bed-nets for two villages for one year. charity f will 
use my $100 donation to provide bed-nets for one village for two years. E helps more 
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people, but f helps people more. assuming the externalities of both these charities 
are the same, which should an effective altruist donate to?
To address questions like these, i collapse the measures of the hMP and the 
hPM imperatives into a single scale—aggregate well-being. if there are no further 
considerations that would weigh in favour of charities E or f, an effective altruist 
should be indifferent between them.
...provided we do not sacrifice anything else of importance in doing so.
however, we might think that there are further considerations which would 
allow us to choose between E and f. One could argue that E is a fairer charity, because 
it increases living standards of as many at-risk communities as it can. f is behaving 
unfairly, the argument goes, in providing a single village with two years of security 
given that children in surrounding villages are dying from malaria every day. if a par-
ticular donor, compelled by this line of reasoning, chose E over f, would that dis-
qualify her as an effective altruist?
no. This is the purpose of the final clause of my definition. Most people profess 
to hold values which are not reducible to measures of well-being. if there are other 
important considerations weighing against aggregate well-being, it may be rational 
for a donor to prefer one altruistic action over another, despite them being equally 
effective. it may even be rational for a donor to prefer a less effective altruistic action 
over one which is more effective if these considerations are sufficiently compelling.
i hasten to clarify that this clause is meant to make room for ineffective altru-
ism only when it is based on what a donor would rationally endorse as an important 
consideration. for instance, men tend to donate more generously to a charity when 
solicited by an attractive female. (raihani & smith 2015) Presumably the gender and 
aesthetic appeal of a charity solicitor does not qualify as an important consideration 
for most people, and therefore donating to an ineffective charity on this basis would 
be out of keeping with effective altruism.
now that we have gone into some detail about what effective altruism is, we 
can discuss its implications for difficult cases—specifically its implications for two 
of population ethics’ most obstinate problems—the repugnant conclusion and the 
non-identity problem. in doing this, i intend to show the plausibility of effective al-
truism in even the thorniest of philosophical issues, and distinguish it from its coun-
terintuitive cousin, classical utilitarianism. Most of the theoretical objections i have 
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encountered to effective altruism centre around its ostensibly objectionable stance 
on population ethics, so it is important to set the record straight on this matter before 
moving on to pragmatic considerations.
EffEcTivE alTrUisM and POPUlaTiOn EThics
The repugnant conclusion
One argument i frequently encounter against effective altruism runs like this:
If I accept effective altruism, I must accept the repugnant conclusion
I reject the repugnant conclusion
Therefore, I reject effective altruism
Just what is the repugnant conclusion, and why might we believe that effective 
altruism entails it? The repugnant conclusion (Parfit 1984) was first raised as an objec-
tion to classical utilitarianism, which holds that the one and only good is to maximize 
aggregate well-being. The objection attempts to invalidate classical utilitarianism on 
the grounds that it concerns itself solely with aggregate well-being and ignores average 
well-being. To see why we might desire an ethical philosophy that concerns itself 
with average well-being, imagine three worlds—a, B, and c. world a is home to only 
a few people (say, 10 people, or n=10), all of whom are extremely happy (whose level 
of well-being is 10, or u=10). By contrast, world B is home to very many people (n=100) 
whose lives are barely worth living (u=1). The inhabitants of world c also have lives 
that are barely worth living (u=1), but there are more of them than in world B (n=101). 
according to classical utilitarianism, we should be indifferent between worlds a and 
B (total utility=100), and prefer c to both of them (total utility=101). The repugnant 
conclusion is that, for any given world, a classical utilitarian will always prefer a world 
full of people whose lives are just barely worth living, so long as there are enough of 
them to offset the decrease in average happiness. surely, the argument goes, we must 
reject the repugnant conclusion, and therefore classical utilitarianism.
Effective altruism is similar to classical utilitarianism in that it advocates max-
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imizing the aggregate well-being of valuable creatures. in fact, classical utilitarian-
ism is a form of effective altruism. The concern is that, by focusing only on aggre-
gate well-being to the exclusion of average well-being, effective altruism makes the 
same mistake classical utilitarianism does. however, there is an important difference 
between effective altruism and utilitarianism which makes effective altruism compat-
ible with a rejection of the repugnant conclusion.
recall that effective altruism holds that we should maximize the well-being of 
‘valuable creatures’, while being purposefully vague about which creatures are in-
cluded in this set. a classical utilitarian has a precise view of which creatures are 
morally important—all of them, including all creatures alive today and which may 
potentially exist in the future. Even if a classical utilitarian would prefer to prevent 
someone from being born—say, a child who would have a debilitating illness with a 
high mortality rate in the first years of life—she would still consider this child a valu-
able creature. if it were possible, the classical utilitarian would rather see this child 
born and live a happy, healthy life.
But effective altruists are not committed to adopting such a broad set of valuable 
creatures. Take, for example, average utilitarianism, which holds that the one and 
only good is to maximize the average well-being of existing creatures. To the average 
utilitarian, the set of valuable creatures consists of those who will have a positive 
impact on average utility and those whose existence cannot be terminated or pre-
vented without diminishing average utility by an even greater amount. imagine we 
live in a world with a few (n=10) very happy people (u=10). further imagine that one 
couple is considering having a child whose life, for whatever reason, will barely be 
worth living (u=1). an average utilitarian would prefer that this couple refrained from 
having a child.
By contrast, a classical utilitarian would prefer the couple did have their child. 
after all, it will increase aggregate utility, if only by a small increment. The difference 
of opinion between average and classical utilitarianism results from how they view 
the set of valuable creatures. since the child’s life diminishes average well-being, the 
average utilitarian considers it morally important if and only if its existence cannot 
be prevented without an even greater decrease to average utility. But the classical 
utilitarian views the potential child as morally important whether or not it is actually 
born. whereas the average utilitarian would view the couple’s choice not to have the 
child as excluding it from the set of valuable creatures, the classical utilitarian would 
view this choice as diminishing the child’s utility from small to zero.
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is average utilitarianism a version of effective altruism? Yes it is. for any finite 
set of valuable creatures, average utility is maximized when aggregate utility is maxi-
mized. does average utilitarianism avoid the repugnant conclusion? again, the 
answer is yes. an average utilitarian would prefer world B (n=10, u=10) to worlds a 
(n=100, u=1) and c (n=101, u=1), and in all cases prefers a world with fewer, happier 
people to a world with more people whose lives are barely worth living.
Bringing the discussion back to the larger picture, i should add that i am not an 
advocate of average utilitarianism, which yields many counter-intuitive conclusions 
of its own. i bring up this ethical view because it is an example of how we can be ef-
fective altruists and still reject the repugnant conclusion. furthermore, we can see 
that the way to do this is by limiting the set of valuable creatures. Effective altruism 
entails the repugnant conclusion if and only if we consider all people currently alive 
and all people with the potential to be born morally important. But such a position is 
not logically entailed by effective altruism.
The non-identity problem
another objection to effective altruism which similarly relies on population 
ethics considerations, relies on the non-identity problem1:
If I accept effective altruism, I must accept that I can be morally blameworthy for 
actions which are not bad for anyone
I reject the idea that I can be morally blameworthy for actions which are not bad 
for anyone
Therefore, I reject effective altruism
The non-identity problem involves a conflict of intuitions. at first, it seems that 
an action can only be bad if it is bad for someone. an action that neither harms nor 
is in any way bad for someone seems as if it cannot be wrong. But now consider a 
14-year old girl who is thinking of having a child. if she decides to go through with 
the pregnancy, her child would live a worthwhile life. however, given her age and 
socioeconomic status, she will not be able to provide as good a life for her baby as she 
1.  The non-identity problem was first discussed in Parfit 1984.
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would be able to if she waited until, say, age 26 to start a family. The intuition here is 
that getting pregnant at her age would be wrong.
But supposing the girl’s own well-being is not affected, for whom would this 
action be wrong? The tempting answer is to say that it is wrong for her child. Yet the 
child she would have at age 14 would live a worthwhile life, and the child she would 
have at age 26 would be a fundamentally different person, having a different genetic 
structure and growing up in a different environment. so postponing pregnancy 
would not so much make life better for her child as it would change the identity of her 
child. in other words, the decision to wait to have a baby would not make life better 
for the child she would have had, but rather would create a different child who would 
lead a better life. having a child at age 14, then, is not bad for anyone.
The same line of reasoning can apply to all future people. Many of the ways to 
‘improve’ the lives of future people do not improve the lives of the future people 
who would have existed anyway, but rather create a different set of future people 
who would lead better lives. There may be very few ways to improve or diminish the 
quality of life of future people without changing their identities. combine the fact 
that future people have undetermined identities with the moral principle that actions 
can only be good or bad if they are good or bad for someone, and we might conclude 
that the moral obligations we have to future people are highly limited.
what does this have to do with effective altruism? The idea is that most effective 
altruists include future people in their set of valuable creatures, and believe that our 
actions can be good or bad in relation to future people. But such a view contradicts 
the moral principle that actions can only be bad if they are bad for someone.
i believe the best way to respond to this objection is by referencing a point i 
made in the introduction to this piece. ineffective altruism, i said, is problematic in 
the sense that it violates our preferences. when people behave as an ineffective altru-
ists, i do not necessarily think they are violating a moral duty so much as behaving 
in a way i disapprove of, and a way they themselves would probably disapprove of in 
light of their own values. we could censure a 14-year old girl who decides to have a 
child on similar grounds. it may not be the case that she is violating a moral duty, but 
it is the case that we would prefer she made a different decision and, on reflection, she 
probably would as well.
This standard applies to considerations of future people in general. imagine you 
can press either a red or blue button. The red button will determine that, a century 
from now, the world will be filled with extremely happy people. The blue button will 
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determine that, in the same amount of time, the world will be filled with the same 
number of people whose lives are only moderately happy. further suppose the identi-
ties of the people in both these worlds are fundamentally different. if someone chose 
to push the blue button, it would be entirely reasonable to conclude that she has 
done something bad. and what makes this action bad is not necessarily that it is bad 
for someone, but that it creates a suboptimal world as judged by our values.
There are two senses of bad at play here. One sense implies a violation a moral 
duty and thereby moral blameworthiness. The other implies a violation of our pref-
erences, and thereby social disapprobation. i would argue for an interpretation of 
effective altruism in which a disregard for future people is bad in the latter sense but 
not necessarily the former. Effective altruism does not imply moral blameworthiness 
for actions which are not bad for anyone, but rather strongly suggests that, in light of 
our own values, we should perform actions which maximize the aggregate well-being 
of future as well as existing people.
Effective altruism does not logically entail counterintuitive conclusions about 
population ethics. we do not need to accept the repugnant conclusion or believe 
that we are morally blameworthy for actions which are not bad for anyone in order to 
be effective altruists. it is interesting to note that the philosopher who first discussed 
the repugnant conclusion and the non-identity problem, derek Parfit, is one of effec-
tive altruism’s most vocal proponents today. Effective altruism is a much less radical 
proposition than utilitarianism and, as i hope i have shown, an extremely sensible 
moral philosophy. however, we might wonder, if effective altruism is so intuitively 
and logically appealing, why is altruism today so ineffective at improving the well-
being of valuable creatures?
alTrUisM as PracTicEd TOdaY
Most People are ineffective altruists
altruism can take many forms, but for this section i will focus on charitable 
giving. Many people act as if under the impression that all charities are equally good. 
But if ‘equally good’ is taken to mean ‘equally effective at improving people’s lives’, 
the claim becomes immensely implausible. The notion that all charities are equally 
good at helping people is about as likely to be true as the notion that all companies 
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are equally good at producing quality commodities. why would it be the case that 
all charities currently in existence just happen to be equally effective at alleviating 
suffering?
suppose we reject the belief that all charities are equally good. There is still the 
epistemic problem of determining which charities are better than others, and par-
ticularly, which charities are the best of them all. Those wishing to object here might 
claim that there are, at present, no means by which to determine how effective chari-
ties are. The claim that we have no way of knowing which charities are better than 
others is only slightly more plausible than the claim that no charity is, in fact, better 
than another. To maintain such a belief, we would have to conclude that homeopaths 
without Borders (yes, this is a real charity) is, for all we know, just as effective at im-
proving well-being as any other charity in existence.
here is a concrete example to illustrate the difference between effective altruism 
and ineffective altruism. suppose we plan to donate $40,000 to prevent or alleviate 
the symptoms of blindness. Providing a single blind person with a guide dog will cost 
the entire $40,000 (Ord 2013 p.1) By contrast, the cost of surgery to cure trachoma-
induced blindness is less than $20.(ibid) with $40,000 one could either provide a 
single blind person with a guide dog, or cure 2,000 people in the developing world of 
trachoma-induced blindness. conservatively estimating that the quality of life im-
provement of providing someone with a guide dog is equal to that of curing someone 
of trachoma-induced blindness, the choice is clear.
Proponents of the ‘uncertainty argument’ outlined above would have to believe 
these estimates so inaccurate as to have misassessed the situation by three orders of 
magnitude. hopefully this possibility is sufficiently unlikely to compel us to accept 
two conclusions. first, charities differ in the degree to which they improve the lives 
of conscious creatures. and second, that the information needed to accurately assess 
cost-effectiveness is at least partially available.
if people were genuinely motivated to give to charity based on an intrinsic desire 
to improve the well-being of others, we might assume they would spend at least a bit 
of time and effort attempting to find this information. But this is not the pattern of 
behavior we observe. 83% of americans donate to charity. (Gallup Editors 2013) Of 
them, 10% say they do not care at all about non-profit performance. (hope consulting 
2011) The rest say they care about non-profit performance, but only 3% have done any 
research to find the highest performing charities. (ibid)
however, you might wish to object, maximizing your impact does not neces-
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sarily require researching high-impact charities. for instance, you might think that, 
instead of spending an hour googling effective charities, you could spend another 
hour at work to earn more money to donate. This is an interesting possibility, but 
highly implausible. Given the amount of time people spend working and the amount 
of money people donate to charity, such a move would only be rational if donors 
expected an hour’s worth of research to yield less than a 0.05% increase in the ef-
fectiveness of their giving2. it is also worth noting that donors who do not research 
never cite anything like this as their reason for not conducting research—the closest 
equivalent being that 4% of them say they are too lazy.(hope consulting 2011)
despite professing to care about effectiveness when asked, most people practice 
altruism ineffectively. This means that those who claim to care about effectiveness 
either hold beliefs about charity which are fantastically detached from reality or are 
being insincere. My vote is for the latter. The cost of providing one guide dog for one 
blind person is the equivalent of curing 2,000 people of trachoma-induced blindness. 
Every dollar we donate to someone in poverty in the developed world could have 
been donated to someone 20 times as destitute in the developing world3. The money 
required to grant a single wish for a terminally ill child could have saved five children 
from dying in the first place4. Yet we continue to donate massive sums of money to 
ineffective charities, and our donations will achieve only a small fraction of their po-
tential to reduce suffering.
2.  in 2014, Us donors gave $358 billion to charity, or about 2% of annual GdP (Giving Usa 2014). 
adjusting for the fact that only 83% of americans, donate, this makes 2.5% per donor on average. 
My calculations assume that individuals give at this rate throughout their lives. The average person 
works for about 80,000 hours—40 hour work week with 2 weeks annual vacation over 40 years. This 
would mean the average donor gives the equivalent of 2,000 hours salary. for one hour of research 
conducted before any donation has been given to yield a negative impact, it would have to have less 
than a 1/2000 or %0.05 increase in effectiveness.
3.  More precisely, the poorest 19% of americans live on less than $27.40 a day (Us census Bureau 
2013). The poorest 17% of the world’s population live on less than $1.50 a day, meaning they are 18 
times as destitute (world Bank 2015). dollar amounts adjusted for purchasing power. calculations 
assume income is flat or normally distributed.
4.  Between august 2012 and august 2013, the Make a wish foundation of america spent over 
$246 million (Make a wish foundation ‘combined financial statements’). in 2014, the foundation 
granted 14,200 wishes. assuming expenses for 2014 were approximately equal to 2013, this amounts 
to $17 thousand per wish (Make a wish foundation ‘wish impact & facts’). By contrast, donations 
to the against Malaria foundation can save a child’s life for $3,340 (Givewell 2014). This means that 
the cost of granting a wish is equal to the cost of saving 5 lives.
Journal of Practical Ethics
 DILLON BOWEN92
why People donate
hopefully this evidence is enough to convince us that the overwhelming major-
ity of people are ineffective altruists who behave as if they are mostly indifferent to 
the effectiveness of their charitable donations. But if people do not donate to charity 
to minimize suffering, why do they donate to charity? research in moral psychol-
ogy has identified two predominant factors—the warm glow of giving and signalling 
effects. however, while both of these factors influence people to give to charity, they 
have only a limited ability to influence which charities people give to. as we will see, 
the cognitive mechanisms responsible for charity choice respond to cues which many 
of us would consider arbitrary and unimportant.
The warm glow of giving is the subjective feeling of satisfaction we experience 
when we make a personal sacrifice to help someone else. (see, e.g. andreoni 1989 and 
crumpler & Grossman 2008) we can experience this feeling whether or not we can 
expect to receive material rewards from our action, suggesting that humans have 
evolved or acquired an intrinsic motivation to make personal sacrifices for the sake 
of helping others. This feeling can even be induced when we know ahead of time 
that our sacrifice will do nothing to further the well-being of the intended recipients. 
simply giving is enough to make us feel good about ourselves.
another reason we give is to show off our moral rectitude. (see, e.g. lacetera & 
Macis 2010; dean & Mcconnell 2012; and rand & nowak 2013) it is important to us 
that our family, friends, and community members believe we are good people. Giving 
to charity is one way to demonstrate our altruistic character. This is called a signalling 
effect—when one of the benefits of an action is the signal it communicates to others. 
in this case, the action is donating to charity, and the signal it sends is that we are kind 
and caring individuals. as the turn of phrase goes, be good to seem good.
These are the two main factors that motivate people to donate to charity. Of 
course, this psychological evidence does not eliminate the role of helping others as 
a motivational factor. it is not a coincidence that we experience a warm glow when 
making a sacrifice for the sake of helping others, even when this sacrifice is entirely sym-
bolic, or that the best way to signal we are good people is by doing something for the 
sake of helping others. The evidence simply suggests that helping others is more of an 
instrumental goal, and holds limited force as an intrinsic motivation.
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charity choice
for most people, reducing suffering and improving well-being provides little in-
trinsic motivation to give to charity. But what motivates us to give to certain charities 
and not others? One third of donors report researching charities before they donate 
to them, but only 3% report researching cost-effectiveness. (hope consulting 2011) 
Of the donors who do research, only 17% of them aim to find information to compare 
charities and determine which of them to donate to.(ibid) and of the donors who do 
comparison research, just over half of them research cost-effectiveness as a decisive 
factor. (ibid) This means that two thirds of individual donors do no research at all, 
and that 90% of those who do fail to consider cost-effectiveness. so what information 
do we use to decide between charities?
charity choice for unresearched donations are determined largely by cognitive 
biases. for example, when we see posters on the metro advertising for a charity you 
can donate to with via text message, what factors determine whether or not we will 
do so? Moral psychology has provided us with an extensive list of biases, but i will 
mention only a few of the most important here:
Physical proximity bias (Musen 2010 as described in Greene 2013)—how far 
away from me are the recipients of my donation?
identifiable victim effect (e.g. loewenstein et. al. 2006)—do i know any personal 
information, especially the name and face, of the recipients of my donation?
in-group bias (e.g. henri & Turner 1979)—are the recipients of my donation 
members of my country, or another group i belong to?
These biases may also serve as a heuristic for which charities donors decide to re-
search. for example, imagine a commuter sees one of these advertisements, but never 
donates to a charity without going on its website. i would conjecture that the com-
muter is more likely to look up a charity which helps people nearby, shows a picture 
of an identifiable victim, and works in her own country. when conducting research, 
a different set of biases come into play, including:
Evaluability bias (caviola et. al. 2014)—does the charity score well on easily 
evaluated measures, particularly low overhead?
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Basic- and subordinate- level bias5—does the charity work on a problem that 
was similar on a basic or subordinate level to a problem that affected me or a loved 
one?
Even though donors overwhelmingly claim to care about cost-effectiveness 
when prompted, helping others effectively plays a minimal role in motivating them 
to donate or determining which charities they donate to. This evidence should lead 
us to wonder whether ineffective altruism is irrational at all. Perhaps helping others 
has very little to do with altruism. and perhaps all of these supposed ‘biases’ we have 
been discussing are perfectly rational features of our decision-making processes.
i believe such a conclusion would be a mistake. if we had access to better in-
formation and took time to reflect on how we choose between charities, i expect 
most people would realize that what they actually care about is improving the lives 
of as many people as they possibly can by as much as they possibly can. By contrast, i 
would wager that most of the factors that currently determine charity choice would 
seem at best minimally important. The aforementioned psychological mechanisms 
really are biases in the sense that they cause us to behave in ways that we ourselves 
would disapprove of upon reflection.
we have already seen this revealed preference structure in tests on the evalu-
ability bias.(caviola et. al. 2014) when asked how much a subject wishes to donate 
to a charity presented in isolation, subjects’ donations correlate more strongly with 
overhead ratio than cost-effectiveness. however, when subjects are provided with 
more information and are allowed to compare charities side by side, their donations 
correlate more strongly with cost-effectiveness than overhead ratio. The conclusion 
we should draw from this study is that, although people behave as if they care more 
about overhead than effectiveness, they do so only because of a lack of information. 
in fact, people care more about helping others effectively, but this preference is only 
revealed under conditions of better information and reflection. Though the relevant 
studies have yet to be conducted, i predict there will be similar findings for all of the 
biases i have just mentioned. To see why, ask yourself about each one in turn:
5.  i hasten to add that i know of no experimental evidence for this bias, so my mention of it here 
should be taken as speculation based on personal observations about people’s motivation for charity 
choice. i would encourage researchers to explore this bias experimentally.
for example, imagine a woman’s child has died of leukemia. There are several levels of abstraction 
at which she could think about this tragedy, each of which may result in different patterns of chari-
table giving. she may think, ‘i have lost my child to leukemia; therefore i will donate to charities 
which fight leukemia’ (subordinate level), or ‘i have lost my child to cancer, therefore i will donate to 
charities which fight cancer’ (basic level), or ‘i have lost my child; therefore i will donate to charities 
which fight the most prevalent causes of child mortality’ (superordinate level). however, people tend 
to focus on the subordinate and basic levels while failing to abstract to the superordinate level.
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Physical proximity bias: does someone’s suffering become less important to 
you as a function of geographic displacement? would you be willing to pay $100 to 
save a child’s life when she is a mile away from you? what about two, twenty, or one 
hundred miles? how far away does this child have to be before you would consider it 
acceptable to let her die for $100?
identifiable victim effect: does someone’s suffering become less important to 
you as a function of not knowing her name? what if you determined to donate $100 
to save a child whose name you were told but forgot before making the donation? 
would this be an acceptable reason to let her die?
in-group bias: does someone’s suffering become less important to you because 
you happen to have been born in different countries? would you be willing to donate 
$100 to save the life of a child from your own country? what if the child moved to a 
different country? would this be an acceptable reason to let her die?
Evaluability bias (specifically overhead aversion): is it worth letting people suffer 
and die to ensure that the employees and cEOs of a charity get paid less? how much 
less would a charity’s employees and cEOs have to get paid in order for it to be worth 
letting a child die?
Basic- and subordinate-level bias: does someone’s suffering become less impor-
tant because they suffer from something that no one you care about has experienced? 
for example, if a loved one of yours were to die from cancer, would this make chil-
dren who die from malaria less important than children who die from cancer? would 
you be willing to donate $100 to save a child from dying of cancer? how dissimilar 
does a cause of mortality have to be from cancer in order for you to consider it accept-
able to let it kill a child for $100?
when confronted with these sorts of questions, i imagine most people would 
realize how arbitrary and unimportant factors like physical proximity are to them. By 
contrast, i predict that cost-effectiveness strikes people as an important factor even 
when subjected to similar scrutiny.
Effectiveness: is the suffering of one person less important than the suffering of 
five people? would you be willing to pay $100 to save one child’s life? if so, does this 
imply you would be willing to pay more to save the lives of five children? Given the 
choice between donating to a charity which would use your money to save the life of 
one child and a charity which would use your money to save the lives of five children, 
would you choose to save one and let five die, or save five and let one die?
we can subject our biases to the same sort of scrutiny for any type of suffering. 
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here i have chosen to focus on child mortality as a prototype cause of misery. But we 
could equally well ask these questions about, say, rape. for the physical proximity 
bias we might ask, How far away does a woman have to be before you would consider it ac-
ceptable to allow her to be raped for $100? My intuition is that it does not matter how far 
away this woman is—suffering is equally important no matter where it occurs. what 
does matter to me is that i do whatever i can to most effectively mitigate suffering and 
foster well-being. if you share this intuition, you ought to be an effective altruist as 
well.
in sum, here is the explanation for why most people are not effective altruists, 
but should be:
we have psychological incentives to donate to charity, even if only a small part 
of these incentives is a desire to improve well-being as effectively as possible. while 
these incentives determine that we should donate to charity, they do not fully specify 
which charities we should donate to.
Given proper information and rational reflection, we recognize that we would 
prefer to choose the most effective charities.
however, the psychological mechanisms we currently use to determine our 
choice of charities rely on factors which, to many of us, seem arbitrary upon reflection.
Therefore, instead of relying on psychological biases, our preferences are better 
served by choosing charities based mostly if not entirely on effectiveness.
OvErcOMinG alTrUisTic BiasEs
at present, most people give to charity because it gives them a warm glow and a 
positive reputation, and choose which charities to give to based on cognitive biases. i 
expect similar psychological mechanisms determine other altruistic decisions, which 
for some people include volunteering and formulating opinions on how government 
should litigate for the public good. as a result, there is much more suffering in the 
world than there would be if only we would act on our altruistic impulses in ways that 
effectively improved people’s lives. fortunately, there are ways to overcome these 
biases.
To illustrate my proposal, it will helpful to draw an analogy between how we 
think about economics and how we think about altruism. like altruistic decision-
making, economic decision-making suffers from a host of cognitive biases. But 
unlike altruistic decision-making, we have developed methods for recognizing and 
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overcoming biases in economic decision-making. in what follows, i explicate this 
analogy further and suggest that the methods we employ to think about economics 
can be used to think about altruism as well.
Overcoming Economic Biases
consider the life-cycle hypothesis in economics, which holds that individuals 
prefer smooth consumption throughout the course of their lifetime. (for an early 
example, see Modigliani 1966) standard economic theory predicts that, all else 
being equal, we prefer to consume more rather than less in any given period of time. 
however, there are diminishing marginal returns on consumption. in any given year, 
we prefer to consume $75,000 worth of goods to $50,000 worth of goods and $50,000 
worth of goods to $25,000 worth of goods, but we more strongly prefer $50,000 to 
$25,000 than $75,000 to $50,000. supposing we have a fixed amount of wealth which 
we can consume at any rate we choose, maximizing utility over the course of our lives 
requires that we consume at a constant rate.
The extent to which we practice consumption smoothing in real life is con-
strained by, among other things, psychological biases. we spend impulsively, take on 
more debt than we can afford, and consistently underestimate how much we need to 
save for our long-term financial goals. One of the biases that precipitate this behav-
iour is known as hyperbolic temporal discounting.(e.g Madden et. al. 2003 and Green et. 
al. 1994) Our reflective preferences dictate that we should smooth consumption, but 
we have an intuitive drive to consume more now and leave less for later. The conflict 
between immediate and delayed gratification is mediated by two largely independent 
cognitive processes. (e.g. Mcclure et. al. 2004 and Metcalfe & Mischel 1999) One—
the faster, emotionally charged process—generates a strong, visceral desire to spend 
now. The other—the slower, emotionally cooler process—implores us to engage in 
long-term financial planning. Things like saving for retirement require our slower, 
reasoning processes to direct or perhaps supersede our faster, intuitive processes.
what this means in practice is that we should explicitly recognize our prefer-
ence for smooth consumption, determine the best way of satisfying this preference 
using the best epistemic norms available to us, and act according to the conclusions 
we reach. Many people, for example, hire a financial consultant to help them plan for 
retirement and attempt to implement her advice by saving and investing accordingly. 
not everyone thinks about retirement or relies on epistemically reliable information 
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such as expert advice when doing so. But we all recognize that these are the sort of 
steps we ought to take if we care about being financially solvent in our later years.
Economic thinking and altruistic thinking have much in common. we are 
capable of recognizing certain preferences in economic and altruistic decision-mak-
ing, such as having a smooth consumption curve and donating to effective charities. 
in both domains, our preferences are hindered by cognitive biases, such as hyper-
bolic temporal discounting and the physical proximity bias. The conflict between 
our rationally endorsed preferences and our biases is mediated by similar cognitive 
processes with similar neural underpinnings. (Greene et. al. 2004; Greene et. al. 2001) 
it is therefore reasonable to expect that the same mode of thought which allows us to 
overcome our economic biases can allow us to overcome our altruistic biases as well.
what this involves is a procedure whereby we:
Explicitly recognize our preferences,
Use epistemically reliable methods to decide how best to satisfy these preferences, 
and
Act on our decisions
in the example of consumption smoothing, we realize that we need to save for 
retirement, rely on information provided by financial experts, and save and invest 
accordingly. we can follow a similar process when it comes to altruism. To begin 
with, we need to recognize our preference for altruistic actions which most effec-
tively improve well-being. The next step is gather information on how best to satisfy 
this preference. Just as most of us rely on financial experts for advice, the most reli-
able way to do so—apart from conducting our own extensive research—is to rely on 
experts such as those at the centre for Effective altruism. finally, we need to imple-
ment this advice, perhaps by switching our donations to more effective charities or 
considering high-impact career options.
is Effective altruism Killing the love?
Before concluding, there is at least one more concern that needs to be addressed. 
studies have shown that the employment of reasoning processes in pro-social de-
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cision-making tasks correlates negatively with generosity. it is empirically possible, 
then, that employing reasoning processes in altruistic decision-making will decrease 
altruism to such an extent that it will more than offset its increase in effectiveness. 
Paradoxically, it may be more effective to make altruistic decisions based on the very 
cognitive biases that make our altruism ineffective.
This is an interesting possibility, but empirically implausible. Though no studies 
have tested this directly, related research shows that employing reasoning process-
es under certain conditions can decrease altruism by 15-50%6. But considering some 
charities are thousands of times more effective than others—for example, with do-
nations to guide dog charities versus trachoma charities—it would be surprising to 
learn that rational thinking increases the effectiveness of our giving by less than a 
factor of two. On empirical grounds, the expected increase in effectiveness eclipses 
the expected decrease in altruism. i would also speculate that the sort of people who 
engage in rational thought for the express purpose of helping others as much as they 
possibly can will be among the least susceptible to having their motivation desiccated 
by reasoning processes. Perhaps the tradeoff between effectiveness and altruism is 
not such a problem outside the lab. while this is still an open question, the available 
evidence suggests that rational thought is essential for effective altruism.
cOnclUsiOn
Today, most people are ineffective altruists. we perform actions for the sake of 
helping others, but we do so in such a way that gives less help to fewer people than 
we otherwise could. Most of our motivation for donating to charity comes from a 
desire to feel good about ourselves and score reputation points. and most of what 
determines our choice of which charities to donate to is a collection of cognitive 
biases. as a result, millions of people and non-human animals will continue to suffer 
unnecessarily.
Effective altruism is the antidote to this miserable state of affairs. concisely put, 
effective altruism is about “aiming to do the most good that one can”. i have offered 
a more precise explanation of what this means, and shown it to be a much milder 
and more intuitive philosophy than utilitarianism. we do not have to accept the re-
6.  rand et. al. 2012 shows a 15% decrease in contribution to public goods games; loewenstein et. 
al. 2006 shows a 50% decrease in charitable contribution to a statistical victim versus an identifiable 
victim.
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pugnant conclusion or consider ourselves morally blameworthy for actions which 
are not bad for anyone in order to be effective altruists. nor do we have to relegate 
considerations of deontological values like justice and fairness to a role of merely 
instrumental importance. all we have to believe is that when we act altruistically, it 
is preferable to give more help to more people, rather than less help to fewer people, 
all else being equal.
if we are to live in accordance with this preference, we need to revolutionize 
how we think about altruism. in addition to thinking intuitively, we need to think 
rationally. i suggest that we reconceive of altruism in economic terms, whereby we 
view acts of charity as an investment in the well-being of valuable creatures. and we 
should demand nothing less of ourselves than to see our investment yield maximum 
returns. Making even the simple decision to donate to effective charities can increase 
our impact by orders of magnitude. faced with these facts, it should be evident by the 
light of our own values that it is no longer acceptable to just make the world a better 
place. This is too modest a goal. instead, we should endeavor to improve the lives of 
as many people as possible by as much as possible, and use our altruism to do the most 
good we can.
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